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The Role of Social Networks in Financing High Technology New Ventures: An 
Empirical Exploration 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on the role of networks in financing high technology start-ups. We 
claim that the role of networks is twofold. On the one hand networks are important 
because network contacts can give direct access to resources. On the other hand, 
networks are important because being affiliated with prominent partners can send 
important information signals to financial resource providers. In this paper we focus 
in particular on a special type of signal, being the referral. The dual role of networks 
is studied in four high technology start-ups using a social systems approach. Our 
results show that start-ups in early development stages that have little experience and 
knowledge more often use referrals in accessing financial resource providers. They 
seem to profit from a network rich in structural holes and many strong connections in 
getting financed. Added to these findings, we found that strong ties are more often 
activated as a referral source than weak ties. On the other hand, the more experienced 
entrepreneurs/start-ups in latter development stages access financial resource 
providers more direct without using referrals. They seem to profit from a network rich 
in structural holes combined with many weak ties.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The uncertainty and lack of information that surrounds new ventures complicates the 
acquisition of resources needed to build and grow ventures. Stinchcombe (1965) 
refers to these complications as ‘the liability of newness’. The specific focus we apply 
in this paper is on the acquisition of financial resources. We argue that social 
networks play an important role in new venture financing. The role of networks in 
financing new ventures is twofold. On the one hand networks are important because 
network partners can directly provide resources to the firms (direct network effect). 
For example many entrepreneurs acquire substantial financial resources through direct 
relations with friends or family. However, networks are also  important in a second 
way because being affiliated with (prominent) partners can be an important 
information signal to financial resource providers (indirect network effect). In this 
paper we predominantly interested in a special type of indirect network effect, namely 
when a (prominent) partner acts as a referral source to financial resource providers 
 
In this paper we research the dual role of networks from the perspective of the new 
venture. We research which relational and positional network characteristics are most 
effective for getting financing. This approach is twofold. First we research how new 
venture get access to financial resource providers. Second, in order two research our 
second network effect, we also research how prominent partners in general are found 
and accessed. Subsequently we research how the prominent network partners play a 
role in the financial resource acquisition process, primary by focusing on referral 
mechanisms. In our research the 4S model is our central theoretical framework. This 
multi dimensional process model of firm development is well suited to study networks 
in an entrepreneurial setting. Based on this model propositions are shaped and tested 
through case studies using a sample of four high technology start-ups. 
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Our results show that more experienced entrepreneurs/start-ups in latter development 
stages don’t use explicit referrals in accessing financial resource providers. They seem 
to profit from a network rich in structural holes combined with many weak ties. On 
the other hand, start-ups in early development stages that have little experience and 
knowledge more often depend on referrals in accessing financial resource providers. 
They seem to profit from a network rich in structural holes and many strong 
connections in getting financed. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Networks in Entrepreneurship 
In previous entrepreneurship studies researchers put much effort in researching the 
effects of network ties on the behaviour of both individuals and organizations (Adler 
& Kwon, 2002; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Birley, 1985; Burt, 1982, 1992, 1997, 
1999, 2000, 2005; Coleman, 1972, 1988, 1990; Elfring, Scholten, Kemp, & Omta, 
2002; Florin, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 1992; Groen, 
1994, 2000, 2003, 2005; Groen et al., 2001, 2002; Groen, Jenniskens, & van der 
Sijde, 2005; Gulati, 1998; Harveston, Wakkee, van der Sijde, & Groen, 2004; Hite & 
Hesterly, 2001; Hulsink & Elfring, 2003; Kirwan, van der Sijde & Groen, 2005; Klein 
Woolthuis and During, 1997; Klein Woolthuis, 1999; Klein Woolthuis, Groen & 
During, 2001; Mitchell, 1969; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Powell, 1990; Powell & 
Smith-Doerr, 2003; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Stinchcombe, 1965; Uzzi, 
1997, 1999; van der Veen & Wakkee, 2004). Researchers in the past have provided 
mixed results in defining optimal network positions and relations. For example Burt 
(1992) claims that individuals and teams that are embedded in sparsely connected 
networks enjoy efficiency and brokerage advantages because of non-redundant 
information exchanges. On the other hand, Coleman (1990) argues that dense 
connections between members of a network lead to cooperative behaviour, which 
provides many advantages over sparsely connected networks. Other researchers who 
apply a more relational network approach claim that a mix of weak and strong ties is 
the optimal configuration. For example Uzzi (1997, 1999) states that the ideal 
network includes a mix of strong and weak ties. A relational governance of strong ties 
promotes the development of trust, the transfer of fine-grained information and tacit 
knowledge, whereas weak ties increase diversity and may provide access to new 
information and opportunities (Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 1992). Researchers 
specifically focusing on business start-up networks claim that the optimal relational 
and positional characteristics of the start-up network are dependent on the specific 
organizational process (Hulsink& Elfring, 2003) the life cycle stage a start-up is in 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001) and the type of technology that is being commercialized 
(Groen, 1994, 2000, 2005) 
 
Networks and Resource Acquisition 
Closer to the subject of our study, there is research conducted that focuses on the role 
of networks on resource acquisition at new ventures. Resource acquisition is one of 
the key processes of entrepreneurship (Greene, Brush & Hart, 1999; Hulsink & 
Elfring, 2003). Researchers have made claims on the range of resources a new venture 
needs, however our research model will come up with its own classification of 
resources. Many researchers focus on the role and importance of networks in the 
acquisition of the wide range of resources (Jenssen, 2001; Jenssen & Koenig, 2002; 
Larson, 1992; Starr & Macmillan, 1990; Uzzi, 1997, 1999; Wilson and Appiah-Kubi; 
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2002; Zhang, Wong, & Soh, 2003). For example the results of Jenssen and Koenig 
(2002) indicate that weak ties are important channels for information, strong ties are 
important for motivation issues and that a mix of strong and weak ties give access to 
finance.  
 
Financing through Networks 
Many researchers focus on the options that entrepreneurs have in financing their 
ventures and their consequences for success.  For example Bates (1997) finds that 
entrepreneurs prefer to rely on family wealth and loans and Colombo and Grill (2005) 
found that start-ups that received private external equity financing have greater start-
up sizes.  Next to studies from an entrepreneur oriented perspective, a huge part of 
literature is conducted from an investor’s perspective (i.e. Fried & Hisrich, 1994; 
Gupta & Sapienza, 1992; Hall & Hofer, 1993; Maula, Autio & Murray, 2005; 
Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). Researchers in this stream of literature mainly focus on 
the psychology and decision criteria of financial resource providers. In our study we 
have a specific focus on the role of social networks in new venture financing. In the 
current literature, some examples of researchers that focus on the direct effect of 
networks in financing can be found. For example Chang (2004) shows that more 
successful start-ups have larger networks and have ties to prominent venture 
capitalists and partners. Zhao and Aram (1995) show that entrepreneurs who are more 
active in ‘networking’ are more successful.  
 
Networks as a Status/Referral Source for Financing 
Next to the direct provision of resources by network partners, we also focus on a 
second network effect in the provision of financial resources. The assumption 
underlying this second network effect is that being related to prominent partners 
increases the status of a new venture and therefore decreases the uncertainty as 
perceived by financial resource providers. Applications of the status concept in 
entrepreneurship studies is limited (Washington and Zajac, 2005), however 
applications of the concept can be found in related fields. Researchers in these fields 
do recognize the value of a more sociological approach to markets and competition 
(Burt, 1982, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2005; Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 1992; Parsons & 
Smelser, 1956; Rangan Insead, 2000; Simon, 1976; Uzzi, 1997, 1999). In 
management and organization literature, we found several definitions of status 
(Perrow, 1961; Podolny, 1993, 2001; Weber, 1922). In all definitions the role of 
networks is recognized. Researchers who research the role of networks in the status 
building process come up with relatively general assumptions on the effects of 
networks on status. One of these fundamental assumptions on status is that status 
‘flows’ through network ties (Lai, Lin, & Leung, 1998; Lin, 1999; Benjamin & 
Podolny, 1999).  
 
The status concept as introduced in the previous section allows us to introduce the 
second effect of networks on the acquisition of financial resources, labeled as the 
indirect network effect. The indirect network effect can be described as an increase in 
strategic capital (status) through social networking (links to prominent players) which 
enables the firm to acquire economic resources more easily. There are some studies 
that focus on indirect network effects in new venture financing. These researchers 
mainly focus on the role of status, reputation, referrals and endorsements in financing. 
For example Shane and Cable (2002) claim that the networks are important to new 
venture financing because they transfer information and therefore decrease the 
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perceived uncertainty of resource providers. Stuart et al. (1999) focused on the 
referral network effect by studying the effects of endorsement on the performance of 
biotechnology start-ups. They show that privately held biotech firms having 
prominent strategic alliance partners and organizational equity investors go to IPO 
faster and earn greater valuations than firms that lack these connections.  
 
In his paper we focus in depth on one type of a indirect network effect, being the 
referral. We assume that a connection with a high status partner is most favorable 
when the partner acts as an explicit referral source for the new venture. In literature 
there are some studies conducted that focus on referrals and new ventures. One 
interesting finding can be found in Aram (1989); he claims that informal investors 
prefer referrals of business service professional over referrals of friends. Another 
finding is that endorsements of high partners are particular valuable in areas in which 
the high status affiliates are perceived to have expertise (Baum, Calabrese, & 
Silverman, 2000; Goode, 1978; Reuber & Fischer, 2005; Stuart, Hong, & Hybels, 
1999). This last finding implies that there are interaction effects that determine the 
effectiveness of social capital. Related to this finding, Fried and Hisrich (1994) found 
that although many VC financing proposals come without introduction, most funded 
business proposals come by referral. In our literature review we found that very little 
studies explicitly focus on positional and relational network characteristics and 
referrals. Two of the few studies that do so are the ones of Batjargal (2005) and 
Batjargal & Liu (2004). In these studies support was found that strong ties between 
the new venture, venture capitalist and the referral source have favorable effects for 
the venture in getting funded.  
 
What do we need? 
The literature review provides some insight in the relevant literature for answering our 
research question. However some gaps and shortcomings can be identified. Most 
research applying a network approach focuses on direct network effects. However 
there is still much work to be done in searching for contingencies that determine the 
effectiveness and value of certain network characteristics. (Higgins & Gulati, 2003, 
2006; Leenders & Gabbey, 1999; Shane & Stuart, 2002). The second network effect, 
the indirect effect of networks, is studied less extensive. The specific positional and 
relational network configurations that lead to for example an optimal status/referral 
effect of networks are poorly studied. More research on this indirect network effect 
will provide a more complete understanding of the role networks play. 
 
The research model we apply should therefore meet several requirements. First the 
model should provide a base to study direct and indirect network effects. Second it 
should provide a theoretical base to check the contingencies that play a role. Third, 
since we focus on financing issues over time, it must be suited to apply a longitudinal 
process oriented approach. In the next section we explain how our model can meet 
these requirements. 
 
RESEARCH MODEL 
 
4S Model 
Entrepreneurship is a field that still lacks coherent frameworks which enable 
multidimensional and multi level analysis of the phenomenon (Davidsson, 2004; 
Shane & Venkatamaran, 2000; Van der Veen & Wakkee, 2004). In order to overcome 
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the lack of a central framework, the 4S framework is developed by Groen (1994, 
2000, 2005) in order to provide a theoretical foundation to research entrepreneurship. 
The origins of the 4S model lie in the work of the functionalist sociologist Talcott 
Parsons (1937, 1964, 1977). Parsons claimed that in every social system four 
mechanisms can be identified. (1)  In every social system there is here is interaction 
between actors who (2) strive for goal attainment. (3) Additionally, these interacting 
actors try to optimize their processes. However, (4) in order to make interaction 
possible, there have to be some common patterns of culturally structured and shared 
symbols. The central hypothesis is that in order for a social system to survive (so as 
well for a new venture); the social system has to have sufficient performance on all of 
these four mechanisms. The 4S model is the central theoretical framework that we 
apply in this paper in order to study entrepreneurial processes. Entrepreneurial 
processes are defined in this context as processes in which an entrepreneur sees a 
business opportunity, develops it into a business concept and brings it into 
exploitation (Groen, 1994, 2000, 2005). 
 
Groen has translated the four basic mechanisms of a social system to an 
entrepreneurial context, resulting in four dimensions and related capitals of the 4S 
model. The central hypothesis of the 4S model is that a company needs ‘sufficient’ 
capital on the four dimensions in order to survive. In short, this means a company 
needs four different capitals namely strategic, economic, cultural and social capital. 
Strategic capital refers to the goal attainment dimension, economic capital to the 
optimization of processes dimension, cultural capital to the pattern maintenance 
dimension and social capital to the interaction dimension. The 4S model provides a 
theoretical foundation for studying entrepreneurship in a systematic way and provide 
a valuable framework in order to position research and shape research questions. An 
important remark on the four dimensions is that they do not exist in isolation. The 
four dimensions interact through the social network dimension. This interaction 
between dimensions allows a dynamic analysis of the four dimensions. For a more 
extensive outline of the 4S framework and examples of studies and research questions 
following from the framework we refer to Groen (2005). 
 
We now show how the 4S model can be used in researching the direct and indirect 
effects of social networks in new venture financing. In doing so, we divide the effect 
of networks in several subsequent sub processes which can be studied separately. The 
following figure provides a guide in order to explain the different sub processes.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
In the figure three actors are visualized. These three actors all bring their four capitals 
of the 4S model in interaction through the social network dimension. By visualizing 
the four capitals for all actors we get a good overview of the complexity and different 
factors that influence the acquisition of financial resources in new ventures.  
 
The figure can provide a good framework in order to explain the relevant sub 
processes in answering the research question. The starting point for of the financial 
resource acquisition process is a start-up identifying and connecting to financial 
resource providers. The origin of this tie can be diverse. Start-up entrepreneurs can for 
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example bring financial resource providers to the firm through previous jobs, 
education or contacts in the private sphere. However, this tie can also be formed after 
start-up through a direct approach or through brokerage by other contacts. The next 
step in the model is a start-up identifying and connecting to prominent partners. Again 
the origins of these contact can be diverse. The last step concerns the actual decision 
of the financial resource provider to provide financial resources to the new venture. In 
this step the financial resource provider makes a decision to provide economic 
resources based on the information he has available. Part of this information is the 
status (strategic capital) of the new venture resulting from the connection/referral with 
the (prominent) partner, labeled as the indirect network effect. In this paper we focus 
in depth on type of an indirect network effect, namely a (prominent) partner acts as a 
referral source of the new venture.  
 
By focusing on the start-up, financial resource provider and referral triangle we are 
able to get a better understanding of the direct and indirect role of networks in 
financing. The arrows between the actors represent the (potential) ties between the 
actors. By studying the network relations and positions within the triangle, we can 
identify interaction effects that determine the prominence of direct and indirect 
network effects in new venture financing. 
 
PROPOSITIONS 
 
Burt or Coleman? 
In this section we concretize the model one step further by shaping propositions on 
the role of the network in the different sub processes as derived from our research 
model. Past research has provided mixed results on the effectiveness of strong vs. 
weak ties and dense vs. loosely coupled networks in (financial) resource acquisition. 
One of the central discussions on the effectiveness of networks is between Burt and 
Coleman, who both have different views on the mechanisms that foster an optimal 
network configuration. 
 
On the one hand there is Burt (1982, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2005) who claims that 
optimal network value is created through structural holes. The structural holes 
argument claims that a certain actor can create value by brokering connections 
between segments that would be unconnected otherwise. Such a network provides 
unique information and control benefits to that actor. On the other hand, Coleman 
(1972, 1988, 1990) claims that network value is not created through structural holes 
but through dense networks and redundant ties. These network configurations 
improve the reliability of information because the same information can reach on 
actor from different sides, therefore creating value. Because dense and redundant 
networks increases trust and reliability of information within the network, actors in 
the network are more committed in doing a good job. For both Burt and Coleman the 
assumption is that the time and money of actors is limited. Therefore an actor has to 
make choices in configuring their network. 
 
In the next section we shape propositions on the effectiveness of weak vs. strong ties 
and positional vs. cohesive network configurations. We shape propositions following 
the sub processes of our research model. In some sub processes the Burt and Coleman 
discussion is less relevant. In that case we turn to other research in order to be able to 
shape propositions.  
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Propositions 
The first step in our research model is a start-up getting connected to financial 
resource providers. Therefore our first propositions focus on this sub process. The 
connection between a new venture and a financial resource provider can have many 
origins. A company can be connected to a financial resource provider through 
previous jobs, education or private connections. However a start-up can also 
intentionally search for financial partners. In this case, two conditions have to be met. 
On the one hand, the start-up has to know what the financial options in the market are 
and second, the venture must be able to get in contact with the financial partners. For 
the first condition Burt would argue that start-ups having networks with many 
structural holes have access to more diverse information. Therefore these start-ups are 
better able to identify the potential financial partners and opportunities in their 
market. Coleman on the other hand stresses the value of trust and commitment in 
networks. Following his rationale one could reason that a start-up in dense networks 
will be informed more honest and accurate about the financial opportunities and 
resource providers. This will be the case because in dense networks the penalty for 
false and incomplete information will be higher. Since Burt and Coleman have 
different views on this process, the following contradicting propositions are shaped. 
 
Proposition 1a (Burt). Start-ups having networks rich in structural holes are 
better able to identify various financial options and financial resource 
providers. 
 
Proposition 1b (Coleman). Start-ups in cohesive networks are better able to 
identify various financial options and financial resource providers. 
 
After having identified the financial options, a start-up has to connect to the financial 
partners. Following the pure logic of Burt, access to financial partners will be most 
effective through weak ties. Burt argues that under the assumption that time and 
resources are scarce, a network with weak ties that span structural holes will be most 
effective. For this step in our research model Coleman would disagrees with Burt on 
the strength of tie argument. Since Coleman stresses the importance of trust and 
commitment, he will assume that strong ties are more helpful in accessing financial 
resource providers. Strong tie partners will be more committed and will better be 
willing to put ones name at stake for the start-up. Next to the commitment of strong 
ties, Brown & Reingen (1987) come up with another rationale why strong ties a 
favorable in getting access to people through referrals. They studied the referral 
behavior in a consumer setting and found that strong ties are more often used for 
referral behavior. It is striking that Burt (1998) in one of his studies argues that it is 
ineffective for low status/illegitimate actors to broker their own networks. For these 
actors it is more effective to “borrow” social capital of their network partners. In that 
case strong tie network partners are activated to help in getting access to unconnected 
resource providers. However for the purpose for our study, we would like to test the 
opposing views of Burt and Coleman. Therefore the following propositions are: 
 
Proposition 2a (Burt). Start-ups having networks with many weak ties are better 
able to access financial partners.  
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Proposition 2b (Coleman). Start-ups having networks with many strong ties are 
better able to access financial partners.  
 
In the next process of the research model the start-up identifies prominent partners. 
For the purpose of this paper we theorize on the situation of relating to unconnected 
prominent partners. The identification of prominent partners follows a similar logic as 
identifying potential financial partners. Again Burt will argue that start-ups having 
networks rich in structural holes are better able to identify the prominent partners. The 
many structural holes will function as a diverse pool for information on prominent 
partners. In Coleman’s rationale trust and reliability play a more prominent role. 
Coleman would argue that the quality of information is higher in dense connected 
networks since the penalty for false and incomplete information is higher. Coleman 
would argue that start-ups in densely connected networks are therefore better able to 
identify prominent partners. Since Burt stresses the value of diversity of information 
and Coleman the importance on reliability the following contradicting propositions 
can be shaped. 
 
Proposition 3a (Burt). Start-ups having networks rich in structural holes are 
better able to identify prominent partners. 
 
Proposition 3b (Coleman). Start-ups in cohesive networks are better able to 
to identify prominent partners. 
 
After having identified prominent partners, a start-up has to get access to them. Burt 
would argue that weak ties will be more effective in doing so that strong ties. The 
underlying rationale is similar to getting access to financial partners. The claim of 
Burt is supported by a study of Lin (i.e.1999). Lin theorizes on the effectiveness of 
weak ties by claiming that getting access to actors higher in a hierarchy is better 
realized through weak ties. Two actors having a strong tie are mostly considered to 
have a similar social status, so in order to connect to higher status actors weak ties are 
required. Coleman will stress the importance of strong ties in getting access to 
prominent partners because they will be more committed in helping the start-up. 
Several findings in related fields support the positive effect of strong ties in getting 
access to prominent partners. For example in a job market context Wegener (1991) 
found support that strong ties are favorable for low status actors in getting access to 
high status actors. Lin (1999) provided a review of studies on networks and social 
status and found mixed findings on tie strength and attained social status. Brown & 
Reingen (1987) studied the referral behavior in a consumer setting and found that 
strong ties are more often used for referral behavior. Since Burt and Coleman follow 
different rationales for getting access to prominent partners, the following 
propositions are shaped: 
 
Proposition 4a (Burt). Start-ups having networks with many weak ties are better 
able to access prominent partners. 
 
Proposition 4b (Coleman). Start-ups having networks with many strong ties are 
better able to access prominent partners. 
 
We now are at the point that a new venture has a relation to potential financial 
resource providers and relations to a prominent partner. We now focus on the question 
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how and if the relations with the prominent partners are explicitly used to convince 
the financial resource provider. In this paper we are mainly interested in one role a 
(prominent) network partner can play in the financing process, namely acting as a 
referral source. For this question we follow a claim of Coleman. He claims that strong 
ties are more committed in helping the start-up through referrals. Added to this, 
Brown & Reingen (1987) found that strong ties are more often activated for referral 
behaviour than weak ties. It’s interesting to note that this logic not only holds for 
referrals of prominent partners but as well for other referrals. Therefore proposition 5 
can be stated as follows: 
 
Proposition 5a (Burt). Weak ties will be more often explicitly activated as a 
referral source than strong ties. 
 
Proposition 5b (Coleman). Strong ties will be more often explicitly activated as 
a referral source than weak ties. 
 
We assume that the strength of the tie between start-up and financial resource 
provider has implications for the effectiveness of referrals. We don’t have a specific 
assumption on the strength of tie between venture and resource provider, however the 
strength of tie has implications for the prominence of the referral network effect. 
When a new venture has a strong tie to the financial resource provider we argue that 
the referral effect of networks is lower. In that case the financial resource provider 
will have more direct information on the venture and will therefore rely less on other 
information sources like referrals. 
  
Proposition 6. A referral will have less impact when the tie between the 
financial resource provider and start-up is strong 
 
The strength of the ties between the new venture and referrers (not necessarily a 
prominent partner) has implications for its effect on a given investment decision. Past 
studies assume that the stronger the tie between venture and prominent partner or 
other referral source, the higher the referral network effect in financing decisions will 
be. A strong tie to a high status partner means that more status will “flow” to the new 
venture (Lai, Lin, & Leung, 1998; Lin, 1999; Benjamin & Podolny, 1999). The study 
of Batjargal (2005) also found support for the effectiveness of a strong tie between 
prominent partner/referrers and start-up for a referral. The logic so far supports the 
claim of Coleman on the effectiveness of cohesive and strong tie network 
configurations. However the logic of Burt could also provide some value here since 
strong ties face down sides as well. Burt would argue that prominent partners/referrers 
having a strong tie to a new venture will be biased towards a positive referral on the 
venture. There are situation in which a referral of a weak tie will be more influential 
than a referral of a strong tie. In showing this we will take the example of a father 
who tells at work that his son is a very talented soccer player. Since almost every 
father wants his son to be a talented soccer player most colleagues will doubt the 
actual talent of the son. However when the same man is not the father of the boy but 
an official scout of the soccer association telling about a boy he saw playing at a game 
last weekend his colleagues will not doubt the talent of the boy. Therefore proposition 
7 a + b are as follows: 
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Proposition 7a (Burt). A referral will have more impact when the tie between a 
start-up and the referral source is weak 
 
Proposition 7b (Coleman). A referral will have more impact when the tie 
between a start-up and the referral source is strong 
 
DATA 
 
Method 
The application of network theory to the direct and (even more) the referral network 
effect in financing new ventures is in a start-up stage. Therefore sources to construct 
propositions on these two network effects in an entrepreneurial stetting are scarce. 
Therefore the propositions in the previous section are constructed with help of general 
network theories or applications of the concept in other fields. In particular for 
propositions on the referral effect of networks, marketing and job search studies 
provided a valuable reference source. However there is still much uncertainty about 
the effectiveness of certain network relations and positions in getting financing. 
Therefore we see case study research as a valuable first step in exploring our 
propositions (Yin,1994). The cases will provide more understanding of the 
mechanisms and rationales that play a role and which network characteristics are 
more effective in getting financing. On its turn the case studies can provide a base for 
a quantitative study. 
 
There were several criteria in selecting our cases. In general, the start-ups we focus on 
can be labeled as front end technology-based firms (Groen, Jenniskens, & van der 
Sijde, 2005). These companies share some common characteristics like high 
technology uncertainty and have a huge need for financial capital. Subsequently we 
selected cases that are based in the Netherlands and have a special interest in the first 
5 years of start-up. For this paper we studied a total of four cases.  
 
Case A is a company founded in 1999 by two young entrepreneurs with a technology 
background and little business experience. In the early stage, the company was 
supported by the university’s business development program. However, after a short 
while this help was not needed any more. The entrepreneurs quickly developed 
networking skills and won several prices for innovation and new business. Currently 
the company has 25 employees. 
 
Case B is a company founded in 2001 by an entrepreneur with over 20 years of 
technology and business experience. Before starting the entrepreneur had already a 
large network in the relevant market. His network and reputation had a large impact 
on the development of his company. Currently the company has about 20 employees. 
 
In 2004 Case C was founded as a spin-off of three companies. The owner had little 
business experiences and a moderate technology background. For its development, the 
company heavily relied and still relies on the parent companies. Currently the 
company has three employees. 
 
Case D is founded in 2004 by an entrepreneur with moderate business and extensive 
technology experience. The entrepreneur had a large network at start and had much 
experience in applying for government grants. Therefore the entrepreneur was able to 
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finance his company solely on private investments and government grants. Currently 
the company has 2 employees. 
 
Data sources 
Table 1 provides an overview of the different data sources we used in collecting our 
data. A first step in constructing the case studies was an exploration of the companies’ 
websites and other online sources. Additionally, we had TOP filesi available for two 
companies. These files were an additional source in order to construct a first picture 
of the start-ups. Subsequently we asked the companies to fill in the Monitor 
Technostarter, which is constructed based on the 4S model. Using this monitor helped 
us to get much data and a complete overview on the central elements that play a role 
in starting a business as derived from our fundamental theoretical model. Finally we 
interviewed the entrepreneurs in order to be able to ask specific questions on the role 
that networks play in financing there business. After the interview, the entrepreneurs 
were asked to fill in a short questionnaire to score the strength of relations they had to 
people they mentioned during the interview. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Using measures during the interview 
The focus of this paper is on the effectiveness of structural holes vs. closure and weak 
vs. strong ties in financing high technology start-ups. However since we intend to 
extend the findings of this case study paper to a larger data set, we choose to use 
existing measures that are used to measure these network characteristics. First, it will 
give us some guidance to score multiple network characteristics, and second it will 
help us to reflect on these network measures. For the positional part of the network we 
chose to use the network tool of McEvily and Zaheer (1999; Scholten, 2006). This 
tool asks entrepreneurs to mention five or less people they turn to for advice on 
business issues and if these people are related. We extended this tool by asking the 
entrepreneurs to score how well these people know each other on a five point scale. 
We recognize that asking the entrepreneurs to score the strength of relations between 
their information sources on a five point scale can be arbitrary, however in a case 
study setting we assume that it can provide interesting insights. 
 
For the relational discussion we decided to use the many used assessment of tie 
strength by Granovetter (1973; Scholten, 2006). This measure gives an indication of 
tie strength by asking questions on intimacy, frequency and length of contact. In this 
case study we will as well try to test the value of these three different variables on the 
acquisition of financial capital. For example it could be that for example intimacy is 
much more effective than for example length of relation. The assessment of the 
relevance of the different variables will enable us to select the most relevant variables 
for our quantitative study later on. 
 
RESULTS 
 
In this section we will discuss the findings resulting from the case studies. The 
findings in the case studies are summarized in table 2-13. These tables can be found at 
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the end of this paper. Based on these results we will discuss the findings per 
proposition as constructed in a previous section of this paper. 
 
Proposition 1a (Burt). Start-ups having networks rich in structural holes are 
better able to identify various financial options and financial resource 
providers. 
Proposition 1b (Coleman). Start-ups in cohesive networks are better able to 
identify various financial options and financial resource providers. 
 
The first set of propositions deals with the effectiveness of structural holes vs. closure 
in discovering financial opportunities. First of all our results show that the positional 
network configuration of a start-up company is heavily dependent on the 
entrepreneurs personal network before starting and the development stage of the 
company. The entrepreneurs of case B and D both had substantial working experience 
in the market where they started their company. Therefore their networks when 
starting their business could be described as big and diverse. They both had extensive 
contacts in business & technology. In theoretical sense we would label their networks 
as structural hole networks from start. However when looking at financing their 
business both entrepreneurs indicate that they don’t consult external sources on 
financing issues. When looking at the finance structure of case B we see five different 
types of funding, being quite diverse. Case D however has only one source of external 
financing, however this is not because they were not able to identify other finance 
opportunities but because the entrepreneur didn’t want others to finance. The 
entrepreneur in case D is experienced in getting government grants and was and is 
able to finance his company with grants 100%, although other parties wanted to 
invest.  
 
The network of case A could be labeled as a small closure network when starting. The 
entrepreneurs started from a PhD position and had little industry experience. 
However, they where very focused on expanding their network from start in diverse 
directions and were successful in doing so. The older the company got, the more the 
company can be labeled as having a structural hole network configuration. When 
looking at its finance structure one will see that they use 6 different sources of 
financing, being a diverse set of financial sources. For the identification of financial 
opportunities the entrepreneurs turns to the participation company, the bank and an 
informal investor. The network of case C can be labeled as small, homogeneous and 
interconnected. In theoretical terms it could be labeled as a closure network. From 
start it heavily depended on its three shareholders and is still doing so for access to 
finance. When analyzing the finance structure of case C you see that its financing is 
quite homogeneous. The entrepreneur indicated that he wants to grow fast, however 
beside of a bank loan and government grants he was not able to identify or access 
other finance sources.  
 
In conclusion we argue that for the identification of financial opportunities, spanning 
structural holes are more effective. In concluding this we take the number of different 
finance sources as an indicator for the ability to identify financial opportunities. Those 
cases spanning structural holes have more diverse financing (except case D, but this 
had an other reason) than case C, which could be labeled as having a clique network. 
Therefore we conclude that for this process proposition 1a has more explanatory 
value than proposition 1b. 
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Proposition 2a (Burt). Start-ups having networks with many weak ties are better 
able to access financial partners.  
Proposition 2b (Coleman). Start-ups having networks with many strong ties are 
better able to access financial partners.  
 
For the purpose of this set of propositions I distinguish between to type of financial 
resource providers. First I will focus on the resource providers accessed with help of a 
referral and second I focus on financial resource providers accessed without help. For 
this set of propositions the situation when a start-up was connected to a financial 
resource provider before starting the business is less relevant. The two companies 
started by “inexperienced” entrepreneurs more heavily depend on referrals in 
accessing financial resource providers. The lack of experience, a network and 
legitimacy/status in the market didn’t allow them to access financial resource 
providers as easy as their “experienced” counterparts. In Case A and C (the 
inexperienced entrepreneurs) we identified 6 financial decision in which a referral 
played a role. The contacts with these referrals were scored as somehow/very intimate 
and were quite frequent (1/weer or 1/month). So for start-ups having little experience 
and legitimacy/status in the market strong ties seem to be more favorable in accessing 
financial resources providers, hereby providing support for proposition 2b.  
 
For the two companies that are started by “experienced” entrepreneurs, a different 
logic seems to be effective. Both case B and D had a large and diverse network from 
start and had legitimacy/status in their market. Therefore they weren’t dependent on 
referrals in getting access to financial resource providers. The logic in accessing 
financial resource providers is mostly that the tie starts with a weak tie through an 
encounter at for example a conference or on initiative of the financial resource 
provider and develops gradually to a strong tie. A similar logic can be found at case A 
now, because at the moment they have builded a substantial track record to be able to 
access financial resource providers themselves. Therefore our findings show that for 
“experienced” entrepreneurs and start-ups in later stages of their development, weak 
ties are more effective in accessing financial resource providers than strong ties. 
Hereby providing support for proposition 2a. 
 
Proposition 3a (Burt). Start-ups having networks rich in structural holes are 
better able to identify prominent partners. 
Proposition 3b (Coleman). Start-ups in cohesive networks are better able to 
to identify prominent partners. 
 
In discussing proposition 1a and 1b we already gave a typology of the positional 
network characteristics of our four cases. We identified case B and D as having a 
network rich in structural holes form start. Case A is a start-up that started form a 
closure situation but was very rapidly able to change their network into a situation 
which can be considered as a network spanning structural holes. Case C started and 
still is in a closure situation. When the entrepreneurs were asked to explain how they 
met prominent partners one could see differences between the answer between the 
structural holes type of network and the closure network. Although the entrepreneurs 
(In particular in case B and D) stressed the importance of coincidence of getting 
connected to prominent partners, they are really actively going out to conferences and 
trade shows. So one could not push the process of getting aware and in contact to 
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prominent partners, however you can intentionally put yourself in the situation were 
“coincidence” is more likely. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs with a more 
closure type of network (A in the beginning and C) are less active in going to 
conferences and trade shows but rely on general source like the internet in identifying 
prominent players in their market. 
 
So there is a difference in identifying prominent players between a structural hole and 
closure type of network. When analyzing the number of prominent partners a start-up 
actually has differences can be identified. Both case B and D were able to mentioned 
a large number of prominent partners in a diversity of areas (business, universities 
etc.) they were connected to. When looking to the diversity of prominent partners, one 
could not see large differences. However a structural hole network type seems to be 
favorable to identify a larger number of prominent partners. Therefore we argue that 
proposition 3a has more explanatory value than proposition 3b in this process. 
 
In our case studies we were not able to compare how prominent partners were. For 
example it could be the case that the one case has more prominent partners than the 
other. Getting an objective measure for how prominent a player is, is difficult, in 
particular when wanting to compare prominent partners in different markets and 
technologies.  
 
Proposition 4a (Burt). Start-ups having networks with many weak ties are better 
able to access prominent partners. 
Proposition 4b (Coleman). Start-ups having networks with many strong ties are 
better able to access prominent partners. 
 
Getting access to prominent partners follows a similar logic to getting access to 
financial resource providers. The effectiveness of network configurations is again 
heavily dependent on the experience of the entrepreneur when starting and the start-
ups development stage. Again you see that the two companies started by 
inexperienced entrepreneurs (A + C) were dependent on referrals when accessing 
prominent partners in nine cases. The relations to the people that acted as a referral 
are labeled as somehow/intimate and the frequency of contact was between 1/week 
and 1/2 months. Therefore we argue that for start-ups having little business 
experience strong ties to referral sources are more effective than weak ties in getting 
access to financial resource providers. So for this group of start-ups proposition 4b 
seems to be most effective. 
 
For the start-ups that were founded by experienced entrepreneurs weak ties seem to be 
effective. Because these start-ups have a larger network and legitimacy/status in the 
market they are better able to access prominent partners directly. Therefore 
proposition 4a seems to have more relevance for this group of start-ups. Next to 
experience when starting, stage of development is as well a factor in accessing 
prominent partners directly. Start-ups like case A have builded a track record and 
therefore you see that as the legitimacy, status and network grows, directly accessing 
prominent partners becomes more efficient. 
 
In the following propositions the attention is focused on the role of referrals in 
financing. Our findings show that referrals are mostly used at start-ups founded by 
entrepreneurs who have little experience. Because these start-ups (Case A+B) initially 
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have small networks and lack legitimacy/status in the market they largely depend on 
their strong ties to provide them access to other actors as explained in the previous 
propositions. These start-ups see much value in using their partners as an explicit 
referral source. However, companies founded by more “experienced” people (Case 
C+D) don’t use their partners as a referral source. However they see much value in 
using their partners as a more implicit information signal, in particular when it 
concerns applying for government grants. 
 
In our research model we assumed that referrals of partners are favorable in acquiring 
financial resources when these partners are prominent. However our findings show 
that referrals of less prominent partners can be just as effective. Our findings indicate 
that in case of a stronger tie between referral source and financial resources provider 
the requirement of a partner being prominent decreases. Therefore we will continue to 
study the role of referrals in the next propositions not only for prominent partner but 
as well for referrals of less prominent partners.  
 
Proposition 5a (Burt). Weak ties will be more often explicitly activated as a 
referral source than strong ties. 
Proposition 5b (Coleman). Strong ties will be more often explicitly activated as 
a referral source than weak ties. 
 
In our cases we identified seven financial decisions in which a referral played a role. 
When analyzing the referrals sources that helped in getting access to the financial 
resource providers, we find that in none of the case the intimacy of the contact was 
scored as “little”. Additionally, the frequency of contact with the referral source was 
quite frequent with a 1/week or 1/month contact frequency. The length of a relation to 
a referral source seems to play a minor role. Applying a similar analysis to referrals 
that played a role in getting access to prominent partners, we find a somewhat similar 
pattern. In the nine cases in which referrals helped in getting access to prominent 
partners, in all cases the intimacy of the contact was scored as somehow. Additionally 
the frequency of contact to these referral sources varied between 1/week and 6/year. 
Important to note is that in four of these cases the university spin-off centre was 
involved. It seems to be that at this centre a weaker tie is sufficient in acting as a 
referral source because this centre is aimed at helping start-ups (frequency of 6/year). 
Again the length of contact seems to play a minor role. In conclusion it seems to be 
that referrals are mostly activated when the intimacy of the contact is scored as 
somehow/very and the frequency of contact is around 1/week or 1/month. Length of 
relation seems to play a minor role in acting as a referral source. All together we 
conclude that strong ties are more often explicitly activated as a referral source than 
weak ties. We continue by discussing the tie strengths that are most effective in a 
referral. 
 
Proposition 6. A referral will have less impact when the tie between the 
financial resource provider and start-up is strong 
 
In studying our cases we found seven financial decisions in which a referral played a 
role. However for the purpose of this proposition I would like to distinguish between 
two different effects of a referral. The first effect is the connecting function of a 
referral; the second effect is the influence of a referral on the actual finance decision. 
These two effects of referrals seem to vary between the different financial resources 
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providers. The different financial resource providers require different tie strengths 
before they invest. On the one hand our results show that informal investors and the 
university only participate when they are relatively strongly connected to a start-up. In 
the cases where an informal investor or university invested in the company the 
intimacy of the contact was scored very intimate and the contact frequency was 
between 1/week or 1/month. On the other hand for a bank or government grant, 
relatively weaker ties are sufficient. Participation companies and private companies 
seem to be somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. For the financial resource 
providers that need a strong tie to the start-up before financing, the connecting 
function of a referral is most important. However when a weak tie is sufficient for 
financing, in our cases the decision of a bank to invest in case C and to a minor extend 
the participation company investing in case B, the effect on the actual decision to 
invest was bigger. Therefore it seems to be that our cases support proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 7a (Burt). A referral will have more impact when the tie between a 
start-up and the referral source is weak 
Proposition 7b (Coleman). A referral will have more impact when the tie 
between a start-up and the referral source is strong 
 
In our case studies we identified seven financial events in which a referral played a 
role. In these events we cannot find a pattern which allows us to conclude that a 
stronger tie is better than a weak tie to a referral source. Since we found no event in 
which a weak tie acted as a referral we are not really able to compare these to 
extremes. However, we had some differences between “strong” and “stronger” ties, 
however when analyzing this differences we didn’t find differences in effectiveness of 
referral. Extending the analysis to the referrals that helped in getting connected to 
prominent partners, we found some support that referrals of contacts that are more 
frequent are more effective in getting connected to prominent partners. However, we 
are not able to prefer proposition 7a over 7b or the other way around. Studying more 
cases or conducting a quantitative study could provide more insight. Table 14 
provides an overview of our findings. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSIONS/DISCUSSION 
 
Our results show some interesting insights in the optimal positional and relational 
network configurations for acquiring financial resources. First of all it seems that a 
network rich in structural holes is favorable for start-up entrepreneurs having various 
experience levels, knowledge and in different stages of development. Start-ups having 
networks rich in structural holes tend to have a more diverse finance structure and 
more prominent partners. We claim that a network rich in structural holes helps a 
start-up better in identifying the various prominent partners and financial 
opportunities than a closure network structure. 
 
The optimal relational network characteristics for getting financing are dependent on 
the experience, knowledge and stage of development of the entrepreneur/start-up. Our 
results indicate that more experience, more knowledge and a latter stage of 
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development increase the value of having weak ties. Because these characteristics 
give the entrepreneur/start-up more status/legitimacy in the market, they can directly 
access financial resource providers and prominent partners by ties that are initially 
weak. So for this type of start-up direct network effects seem to play a larger role in 
getting financed. This does however not imply that they do not profit from having 
prominent partners in getting financing. Although these entrepreneurs/start-ups don’t 
use explicit referrals in accessing financing, they acknowledge the value of 
mentioning a prominent partners in applying for a government grant. However, for 
start-ups in earlier stages of development having less experience and knowledge 
strong ties seem to have more value. Because these start-ups lack legitimacy/status in 
the market, they are more dependent on their strong ties that act as a referral in 
accessing financial resource providers and prominent partners. In general we found 
that strong ties are more often activated as a referral source than weak ties. This 
mechanism seems to be active in particular in accessing financial resource providers 
that invest under larger uncertainty. So more inexperienced entrepreneurs and new 
ventures in early stages of their life cycle are more heavily rely on indirect network 
effects in getting financed.  
 
The conclusions above have large implications for theory. Whereas in literature a 
structural hole network is often coupled to the effectiveness of weak ties and a closure 
network coupled to the effectiveness of strong ties, our findings show that positional 
and relational network characteristics cannot be coupled this simple. Start-ups having 
little experience and in early stages of development seem to profit from a network rich 
in structural holes combined with having strong ties, hereby proving the effectiveness 
of structural holes combined with having strong ties. Next to the implications for 
general network theory our findings show the value of the 4S model. Some studies 
study the effect of networks on the acquisition of financial resource without 
controlling for important variables. Our findings show that next to the social network 
en economic dimension, we should as well include strategic (legitimacy/status) and 
cultural (knowledge/experience) factors in order to fully understand the role of 
network in financing high tech start-ups. 
 
On a more operational level, we tested the value of two theoretical measurement tools 
for networks. For the positional network identification we included the McEvily and 
Zaheer (1999) question in our interview. Their tool was very helpful in getting a feel 
of a start-ups positional network structure. For tie strength we used the three questions 
of Granovetter (1973) on intimacy, frequency and length of contact. Our case studies 
however showed that intimacy and frequency had more value in indicating strength of 
tie and willingness to act as a referral source than length of contact. 
 
An additional interesting finding concerns the effectiveness of referrals and the 
prominence of the referral source. In shaping our propositions we assumed that a 
referral of a partner is more effective when this partner is prominent. However our 
findings show that this is not always the case. Our findings show that the stronger the 
tie between referral source and financial resource provider, the less important the 
prominence of the referral is. It seems that when these two actors are strongly tied, the 
personal trust and commitment between these actors is more important than the 
prominence of the partner.  
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Our findings showed that several characteristics of the start-up have a large impact on 
the effectiveness of certain network configurations. However our findings show that 
also the characteristics of the financial resource provider and the prominent partners 
involved play a role. For example different financial resource providers require 
different tie strength for financing. For example for a bank a weak tie is sufficient in 
order to get financing, whereas for an informal investor a strong tie connection is 
required before he will provide financial resource to the firm. This has implications 
for the role that referrals play at different financial resource providers. For financial 
resource providers where a weak tie is sufficient for financing, the actual impact on 
the decision is bigger, whereas for financial resource providers that require a strong 
tie before they finance the connection function of a referral is more important.  
 
Added to this the type of prominent partner that acts as a (explicit/implicit) referral is 
as well important in the financing process. Our results show that referrals of business 
partners are valued over referrals of university partners. The finding that different 
types of financial resource providers and prominent partners have an effect on optimal 
network configurations has implication for future research as explained in the next 
section 
 
SHORTCOMINGS/DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Our case studies provide some interesting insights. However, this paper provides 
many interesting directions for future research. First a quantitative study on our 
research subject could be a good thing on order to statistically back up our findings. In 
addition, our case studies showed that the effectiveness of certain network 
configurations is heavily dependent on several key variables. For example the 
experience and network an entrepreneur has before starting up his business, the life 
stage of a company and the different types of financial resource providers and 
prominent partners all have implications for the effectiveness of certain network 
configurations. So by including these factors in a quantitative study could enable us to 
be very specific on the exact role these factors play in networking for financing.    
 
An other interesting direction for future research is extending the role of networks 
with simply being connected to a prominent partner without using it as a referral. This 
case study paper mainly focused on the role of referrals in financing. However, our 
findings indicate that simply being connected to prominent partners can as well have a 
strong information effect to financial resource providers. Therefore future studies 
should as well focus more on this network mechanism. 
 
Focusing on other resources as well could be an additional direction for future 
research. Since we focused on the acquisition of financial resources, future research 
should as well focus on the different network effects as identified in this paper in 
acquiring for example strategic capital or human capital. 
 
Finally, in this paper we took the perspective of the start-up company. A nice addition 
would be studying the perspective of the investor as well. Studying this perspective as 
well would provide more insight in the most effective network configurations from 
their perspective. For example it would be possible to study the strength of tie 
between referral and financial resource provider and its effect on the financing 
decision. Additionally when combing this with the result of the study form a start-up 
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perspective, it would be possible to study all kinds of interaction effects. For example 
we could study interactions between strengths of ties between start-up and financial 
resource provider, start-up and referral and financial resource provider and referral 
source! 
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TABLE 1 
Data sources 
 Case A Case B Case C Case D 
Monitor 
technostarter 
x x x x 
Interview x x x x 
Short questionnaire x x x x 
TOP file x - x - 
Company website x x x x 
Other online 
sources 
x x x x 
 
x = Data source available 
- = Data source not available 
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TABLE 2 
Main information sources case A 
Information 
source 
Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation (2006) 
Other 
Entrepreneur 
Very 1/week 6 year 
Informal 
investor 
Very 1/week 5 year 
BD University 
research 
institute 
Very 1/month 5 year 
Participation 
company 
Somehow 1/month > 7 year 
Bank Little 3/year 7 year 
 
TABLE 3 
Interconnectiveness information sources case A 
Information 
source 
Other 
entrepreneur 
Informal 
investor 
BD University 
research 
institute 
Participation 
company 
Bank 
Other 
Entrepreneur 
xxxx - - 3 - 
Informal 
investor 
xxxx xxxx 2 5 1 
BD University 
research 
institute 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 5 - 
Participation 
company 
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 3 
Bank xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 
 
XXXX = Not applicable 
- = No relation 
1-5 = Assessment of the strength of tie by the entrepreneur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29
TABLE 4 
Main information sources case B 
Information 
source 
Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation (2006) 
MT Very 1/week 5-10 year 
Board Very 1/month 5-20 year 
Shareholders Somehow 1/month 4-20 year 
 
TABLE 5 
Interconnectiveness information sources case B 
Information 
source 
MT Board Shareholder 
MT xxxx 3 3 
Board xxxx xxxx 3 
Shareholders xxxx xxxx xxxx 
 
XXXX = Not applicable 
- = No relation 
1-5 = Assessment of the strength of tie by the entrepreneur 
 
 30
TABLE 6 
Main information sources case C 
Information 
source 
Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation (2006) 
Wife Very 1/week 15 year 
Other 
Entrepreneur 
Very 1/week 2 year 
Other 
entrepreneur 
 
Somehow 1/week 2 year 
 
TABLE 7 
Interconnectiveness information sources case C 
Information 
source 
Wife Other 
entrepreneur 
Other 
entrepreneur 
Wife xxxx - - 
Other 
entrepreneur 
xxxx xxxx 5 
Other 
Entrepreneur 
 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 
 
XXXX = Not applicable 
- = No relation 
1-5 = Assessment of the strength of tie by the entrepreneur 
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TABLE 8 
Main information sources case D 
Information 
source 
Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation (2006) 
Employee Very 1/week 4 year 
University 
researcher 
Very 2/month 10 year 
Manager at 
other company 
 
Very 1/month 12 year 
Manager at 
other company 
Somehow 1/month 4 year 
Manager at 
other company 
Somehow 1/month 3 year 
 
TABLE 9 
Interconnectiveness information sources case D 
Information 
source 
Employee University 
researcher 
Manager at 
other company 
Manager 
at other 
company 
Manager at 
other 
company 
Employee xxxx - 5 - 1 
University 
researcher 
xxxx xxxx 1 5 - 
Manager at 
other company 
 
xxxx xxxx xxxx 1 - 
Manager at 
other company 
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx - 
Manager at 
other company 
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx 
 
XXXX = Not applicable 
- = No relation 
1-5 = Assessment of the strength of tie by the entrepreneur 
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TABLE 10 
Ties to financial resource providers 
 
Company Finance source Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation 
(2006)* 
Company A Informal investor Very 1/week 5 year 
 University Very 1/month 5 year 
 Participation 
company 
Somehow 1/month > 7 year 
 Personal loan Somehow 3/year 7 year 
 Bank Little 3/year 7 year 
 GG Little 1/year n.a. 
Company B Informal investors Very 1/month 4/5 year 
 University Very 1/week >10 year 
 Other company Somehow 1/year 10 year 
 Participation 
company 
Somehow 3/year 5 year 
 GG Little 3/year n.a. 
Company C Other company Very 1/week  2 year 
 Other company Somehow 1/week 2 year 
 Other company Somehow 1/month  9 year 
 GG Somehow 1/year   n.a. 
 Bank Little 1/month 1 year 
Company D GG Somehow 3/year n.a. 
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TABLE 11 
Referrals and getting access to financial resource providers 
 
Company Finance source Referral as 
the source of 
contact 
Intimacy 
of contact 
Frequency Length 
of 
relation 
2006 
Importance of 
referral 
Company A Informal 
investor 
Participation 
company 
Somehow 1/month >7 year + 
 University BD officers 
university 
Somehow 6/year 7 year + 
 Participation 
company 
No **** **** **** **** 
 Bank No **** **** **** **** 
 GG No **** **** **** **** 
 Personal loan No **** **** **** **** 
Company B Participation 
company 
BD officer 
research 
institute 
Very 1/week >10 year + 
 Other company No **** **** **** **** 
 University No **** **** **** **** 
 Informal 
investors 
No **** **** **** **** 
 GG No **** **** **** **** 
Company C Other company Business 
partner 
Very 1/week 2 year ++ 
 Bank Business 
partner 
Very 1/week 2 year ++ 
 Other company Business 
partner 
Somehow 1/week 2 year ++ 
 Other company Business 
partner 
Somehow 1/month 9 year ++ 
 GG No **** **** **** **** 
Company D GG No **** **** **** **** 
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TABLE 12 
Ties to prominent partners 
 
Company Prominent 
partners 
Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation 2006 
Indirect 
importance of 
prominent 
partner(s) in 
financing 
Company A Informal 
investor 
Very 1/week 5 year 0 
 University 
research 
institute 
Very 1/month 5 year +/- 
 University 
professor 
Very 3/year 6 year +/- 
 Business coach Somehow 1/year 6 year 0 
 Business coach Little 1/year 6 year 0 
Company B University 
research 
institute 
Very 1/week >5 year +/- 
 Large customer 
(s) * 
Somehow 1/month 1-5 year 0 
 Alliances ** Somehow 1/month 1-5 year + 
Company C Other 
Entrepreneur 
Very 1/week 2 year 0 
 Big company Somehow 1/month 2 year 0 
 Big company Somehow 1/month 2 year 0 
 Big company Somehow 1/month 2 year + 
 University 
research 
institute 
Somehow 2/month 12 year +/- 
 University 
professor 
Somehow 6/year 2 year +/- 
Company D University 
research 
institute 
Very 1/week >5 year ++ 
 Big company Very 1/week < 2 year ++ 
 Big company Somehow 1/month 4 year ++ 
 Big company Somehow 1/month 3 year ++ 
 Scientific 
institute 
Somehow 1/month < 2 year ++ 
 Big 
companies*** 
Somehow 1/month 1-5 year ++ 
 
* This is a group of different customers sharing the same network characterictics with respect to the company 
studied  
** This is a group of different alliance partners sharing the same network characterictics with respect to the 
company studied  
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TABLE 13 
Referrals and getting access to prominent partners 
 
Company Prominent 
partners 
Referral as 
the source of 
contact 
Intimacy of 
contact 
Frequency Length of 
relation 2006 
Importance 
of referral in 
getting 
connected 
Company A Informal 
investor 
Participation 
company 
Somehow 1/month >7 year + 
 Business 
coach 
BD officers 
university 
Somehow 6/year 7 year + 
 Business 
coach 
BD officers 
university 
Somehow 6/year 7 year + 
 University 
professor 
BD officers 
university 
Somehow 6/year 7 year + 
 University 
research 
institute 
BD officers 
university 
Somehow 6/year 7 year + 
Company B Large 
customer (s) * 
No **** **** **** **** 
 Alliances ** No **** **** **** **** 
 University 
research 
institute 
No **** **** **** **** 
Company C Big company Company that 
invested in C 
Somehow 1/week 2 year ++ 
 Big company Company that 
invested in C 
Somehow 1/week 2 year ++ 
 Big company Company that 
invested in C 
Somehow 1/week 2 year ++ 
 Other 
Entrepreneur 
Company that 
invested in C 
Somehow 1/week 2 year ++ 
 University 
research 
institute 
No **** **** **** **** 
 University 
professor 
No **** **** **** **** 
Company D Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 University 
research 
institute 
No **** **** **** **** 
 Scientific 
institute 
No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
 Big company No **** **** **** **** 
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TABLE 14 
Propositions/Results 
 
Proposition 1a (Burt). Start-ups having networks rich in structural holes are better able to identify various 
financial options and financial resource providers 
+ 
Proposition 1b (Coleman). Start-ups in cohesive networks are better able to identify various financial 
options and financial resource providers 
- 
Proposition 2a (Burt). Start-ups having networks with many weak ties are better able to access financial 
partners.  
+* 
Proposition 2b (Coleman). Start-ups having networks with many strong ties are better able to access 
financial partners 
+** 
Proposition 3a (Burt). Start-ups having networks rich in structural holes are better able to identify 
prominent partners 
+ 
Proposition 3b (Coleman). Start-ups in cohesive networks are better able to identify prominent partners - 
Proposition 4a (Burt). Start-ups having networks with many weak ties are better able to access prominent 
partners 
+* 
Proposition 4b (Coleman). Start-ups having networks with many strong ties are better able to access 
prominent partners 
+** 
Proposition 5a (Burt). Weak ties will be more often explicitly activated as a referral source than strong 
ties 
- 
Proposition 5b (Coleman). Strong ties will be more often explicitly activated as a referral source than 
weak ties. 
+ 
Proposition 6. A referral will have less impact when the tie between the financial resource provider and 
start-up is strong 
+ 
Proposition 7a (Burt). A referral will have more impact when the tie between a start-up and the referral 
source is weak 
? 
Proposition 7b (Coleman). A referral will have more impact when the tie between a start-up and the 
referral source is strong 
? 
 
*  Proposition true for entrepreneurs with extensive experience in the market/technology 
* * Proposition true for entrepreneurs lacking extensive experience in the market/technology 
 37
APPENDIX 
 
Case description case A 
 
Case A is a company founded in 1999 by two young entrepreneurs with a technology 
background and little business experience. In the early stage, the company was 
supported by the university’s business development program. However, after a short 
while this help was not needed any more. The entrepreneurs quickly developed 
networking skills and won several prices for innovation and new business. Currently 
the company has 25 employees. 
 
The positional network could be described as a clique network at start. The network 
of the company was mainly focused on technology and less on market. However the 
entrepreneurs were very eager to develop their network. Hereby they were helped by 
the University’s business development department. After a short while this help 
wasn’t needed anymore and the entrepreneurs were able to expand their network in 
multiple directions on their own. Next to their developed network skills, the winning 
of several prices helped them in getting a status in the market. Therefore accessing 
new partners themselves became more effective. In the current situation the network 
could be labeled as a network rich in structural holes. 
 
For financing the company uses a variety of sources. One source (the participation 
company) had already a weak connection to the company before starting. The bank, 
Government Grants and a personal loan were accessed by the entrepreneurs 
themselves. The university and the informal investor were connected through 
mediate/strong tie referrals. In the current situation the company goes for financing 
information to the informal investor, the participation company and the bank. When 
asking the company about its most prominent partners a variety of partners came up. 
The prominent partners explicitly mentioned were all accessed through 
mediate/strong tie referrals.   
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Case description case B 
 
Case B is a company founded in 2001 by an entrepreneur with over 20 years of 
technology and business experience. Before starting the entrepreneur had already a 
large network in the relevant market. His network and reputation had a large impact 
on the development of his company. Currently the company has about 20 employees. 
 
In theoretical terms the positional network of case B can be described as a structural 
hole network from start. Because of his experience and reputation the entrepreneur is 
able to directly connect to new partners without help form referral sources. The 
entrepreneur was and is very active in visiting conferences and trade shows. The 
entrepreneur sees this as an intentional strategy to enhance the chance of getting new 
contacts. Meeting a new partner is often described as coincidence; however the 
entrepreneur claims that you can manipulate the factors that enhance “coincidence”. 
 
For accessing financial resources the company was not dependent on referrals. The 
company has five types of different financial sources. The other company that 
invested in B and the University were already connected to the entrepreneur before 
starting. The government grants and informal investor were accessed by the 
entrepreneur himself without help from a referral. Only in accessing the participation 
company, the company had some help a (strongly tied) research institute business 
developer.The entrepreneur doesn’t consult external information sources for financing 
because he claims that all financial expertise is present in the company. The company 
has a wide variety of prominent partners, all accessed without help of explicit 
referrals.
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Case description case C 
 
In 2004 Case C was founded as a spin-off of three companies. The owner had little 
business experiences and a moderate technology background. For its development, the 
company heavily relied and still relies on the parent companies. Currently the 
company has three employees. 
 
The network of can be described as a closure network when starting. The company is 
a spin-off of three companies and is still heavily dependent on these companies in 
developing its networks. In contrast to case B, the entrepreneur of company C states 
that he doesn’t visit many conferences and trade shows since it takes a lot of time.  
Although the size of the network has grown over time, the network of C can still be 
labeled as a closure network, since the network is still very redundant.  
 
In accessing financial resource providers, the network is/was very dependent on 
referrals. Only for Government Grants, referrals didn’t play a role. However for the 
three other companies and the bank, referrals of mediate/strong ties played a very 
important role. In getting connected to prominent partners, a similar pattern can be 
identified. In particular for prominent market partners, strong ties were an important 
referral source. 
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Case description case D 
 
Case D is founded in 2004 by an entrepreneur with moderate business and extensive 
technology experience. The entrepreneur had a large network at start and had much 
experience in applying for government grants. Therefore the entrepreneur was able to 
finance his company solely on private investments and government grants. Currently 
the company has 2 employees. 
 
Similar to case B, the network of D can be described as rich in structural holes from 
start. The entrepreneur has extensive experience in working for a university. In 
working for the university he was responsible for writing and executing many project 
proposals. In doing this work he gathered extensive contacts within universities and 
business, because getting funding is often dependent on having a variety of partners 
cooperating in the project. When starting the business the entrepreneur uses the 
network he developed when working for the university. Added to this the name and 
status he gained in doing this work helps him in getting direct access to new partners. 
The financing of company D is quite a rare case. Because the entrepreneur had much 
experience in applying for Government Grants, he is able to fully finance his 
company by Government Grants (next to a personal investment). The entrepreneur 
doesn’t consult external information sources for financing, because the company has 
the knowledge of applying for Government Grants within the company and has no 
additional need for money. The prominent partners of the company as mentioned in 
the interview, were all accessed directly without using a referral.  
                                               
i At the University of Twente there is a support program for entrepreneurial start-ups. When supporting 
the start-ups a file is kept on the development of the company containing several versions of business 
plans and notes of meetings with the support coaches. More information on the TOP program can be 
found at www.utwente.nl/top 
